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Balanced Solution for Afghanistan

By: Khalil Nouri and Terry Green

It is increasingly obvious that the Obama Administration has little choice but to accept Hamid Karzai as the next Afghan leader despite widespread claims of election fraud.  This reality understandably increases pressure on President Obama to find ways to justify further troop deployments to Afghanistan that will in essence prop up a regime regarded as systematically corrupt.

Corruption remains the biggest challenge to positive developments in Afghanistan, because it sucks away the sense of hope needed to ignite the flame of nationhood.  Now too many Afghans are disillusioned by the extent of government corruption, and the lack of: basic services, minimal rules of law, and security.  This, in turn, has enabled the Taliban to return in a far more deadly and efficient manner than before.  The recent elections increasingly viewed as illegitimate have only provided fuel for the Taliban’s misinformation apparatus, and weakened what little remained of Afghan government support.  Thus, an alternative must be found to offset the slow moving U.S. attempt to foster a plan for the “eradication of corruption” because the current pace is not only frustrating, it is dangerous.

According to U.S. and European officials, in hindsight, the main thing missing from the 2001 Bonn agreement which is now quite evident (and because of its absence unscrupulousness reigns unchecked) is the non-ratification of an independent body in the Afghan government to cleanup evidence of government corruption.  As perceived, this utmost and essential post, second to the president, would have been a Prime Minister or a Chief Executive figure who could challenge a corrupt government in Kabul.

The creation of such a role was designed to bypassing a Karzai presidency; and in a further dilution of presidential power, money could have been diverted from the Kabul government directly to the tribes in various provinces.  But according to a Guardian UK report in March 2009, Karzai was uneasy about this initiative and strongly warned the West “not to treat Afghanistan resembling a puppet state.” Furthermore, he declared, “This is nonexistent in the Afghan constitution, and therefore the government structure will remain invariable.”

However, assuming that the Prime Ministerial position was actually confirmed and a body was actually chosen, still an atmosphere of unfriendliness and hostility between the two entities of top Afghan government poles could have resulted in a futile effort to fight corruption; as well as little assurance that the said funds would be detoured directly to the tribes.

In light of stated conditions, the upcoming strategy review being weighed by the Obama Administration must focus primarily on two main objectives for success in Afghanistan: governance and security.

In our own analysis we focus on a vital missing element to governance in Afghanistan.  But before we can address this element, we need to resolve the issue not only of where we are, but of where we believe we ought to go.  Our analysis suggests that Afghanistan’s future lies in Afghanistan’s past.  Afghanistan must first regress before it can progress.  Afghans must regress back to the era prior to Soviet occupation in 1979, back before the sense of enduring derailment of tranquility and success became part of their national consciousness. 

The question that now emerges is: what type of individual exists who can rule the current 16^th century resemblance Afghanistan and bring it into the 21^st century, achieving the path of balance and unity, hope and prosperity that it had prior to 1979?  

Although Karzai may not fall within the criterion for being “the” suitable an acceptable Afghan head of state that can win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people and bring them into the 21^st century, there are no alternatives to the recent election results.  Thus, until the end of his term in 2015, it is feasible to expect that conditions in Afghanistan may spiral further into disorder and unrestrained chaos unless an alternative answer is introduced. 

 According to a Radio Free Europe report dated September 2^nd, 2009, another major corruption scheme by the Afghan government is the nuanced indulgence and manipulation of the complex tribal politics in Afghanistan.  This is the root cause for instability, and it lies in the intense political competition among leading tribal families and clans mainly in Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif areas.  Instead of seeking balance and stability, they have outmaneuvered their political rivals and through extensive alliances they have establish themselves as the undisputed leaders of the region. This scheme has far-reaching consequence and results in damaging the harmony and national unity in Afghanistan. Thus, this has immensely alienated other tribes being pushed from the course of prosperity and consequently rejuvenates Taliban recruitments into its organization.  The element missing in today’s Afghanistan is a sense of mutual benefit for all tribal elements and a balance of power between the tribes reflected in the central government; without it there is no peace. 

Tribal stability in Afghanistan is a very crucial and necessary elemental structure for national stability.  This is the multifaceted societal power structure that has kept the entire country stable and intact for hundreds of years.  The Soviet invasion and occupation beginning in 1979 tipped that balance of power, and the nation has not recovered.  

In concurrence with the Rand Corporation, Dr. Seth Jones’ report on National Public Radio in February 2009, states that success in Afghanistan has historically been a combination of top-down efforts in urban areas and bottom-up efforts in rural areas.  If we look at the period when King Zahir Shah ruled in 1933 to 1973; then, the central government had control over urban areas of the country and along some of the key lines of communication, the major roads for example; but in the rural areas of the country jirgahs (grand assembly of elders) of tribal and sub-tribe clans (Aquam) were in control.  Therefore, true success and stability in Afghanistan historically had been a combination of top down rule and control of urban areas, and bottom up rule and control of rural areas.

To ensure stability, confidence and mutual respect towards both ends of the arrangement, those at the bottom chose not to risk undermining the sitting government; and respectfully there was always a link between central government and local elements.  The then popular King, being from an elite Mohammadzai tribe was very well renowned and connected to the tribes through his royal congregation at the Kabul palace.   In this arrangement, local elements could (A) protect themselves and (B) provide services inside their areas of control.  Hence, if one were to tap into local resources, it would require less international presence rather than more in some areas of operation. 

Placing the mentioned realities into perspective, and traditionally speaking, Hamid Karzai has neither the influence nor the credibility to equalize the tribal differences and restore peace and stability among them.

Knowing the intricacy of Afghan tribal politics and its importance, hence Afghanistan needs someone in a capacity to steer the tribes analogous to former King Zahir Shah, but in terms of a sincere and dynamic tribal lead, who depicts himself as business czar.  He should not only be familiar with the current vital requirement on the ground, but also have deep tribal perception, affiliation and flamboyancy to restore the regional tribal balances and convey prosperity.

This figure could be obtainable and handpicked; there is no requirement for his election or rejection by the central government.  He will be absolutely sovereign of the Afghan nation because his heritage must arrive from within the tribes in Afghanistan.  He must develop a viable plan to introduce business-to-business initiatives in reflectance of prosperity from bottom-up and eventually top-down in a foreseeable future inside Afghanistan.  In addition, he must confidently maintain the ability to stand strong whether among the tribal chieftains or business interests from the West. 

The Afghan business czar should call upon Afghans all over the world (and the American Afghan community in particular) to help restore Afghanistan to its pre 1979 world-class conditions.  He should gather a select group of afghan tribal leaders and elevate them to world-class status; to be business ambassadors to the world for their own tribal regions.  A series of Business-Jirgahs should be held on a regular basis for education and training within the tribal regions; and Afghan-American Business-Jirgah representatives can be invited to attend as family.

Khalil Nouri and Terry Green are the cofounders of New World Strategies Coalition Inc. a “center for integrative- studies” and a “center for integrative- action”, a native think tank for nonmilitary solution studies for Afghanistan.  www.nwscinc.org .